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Industrial Control systems are a vital 
component within critical national 
infrastructure such as the power grid, water 
treatment and nuclear power plants [1]. The 
criticality of these systems makes them an 
attractive target for cyber-criminals and state-
sponsored adversaries, which is highlighted by 
the increasing number of serious incidents [2]. 
Timely detection of intrusion attempts is critical 
for preventing attackers from reaching sensitive 
parts of ICS networks. Honeypots are part of the 
best practices, as they can provide valuable 
threat intelligence and slow down or even 
completely misdirect attackers. Nonetheless, 
ICS-specialized honeypots are sparse and not 
widely deployed [3]. Poorly configured 
honeypots or honeypots that lack realistic 
interactivity can be easily avoided or even 
exploited by skilled attackers [4]. Additionally, 
even when honeypots are successfully used to 
trap an attacker, analysing and correlating the 
collected data and reconfiguring the network 
accordingly can be a time-consuming and 
largely manual process. The overheads of 
honeypot data analysis may inhibit timely and 
proactive attack mitigation [5, 6]. 
The proposed system aims to address the 
shortcomings of the current industrial honeypot 
implementations, by combining a network of 
honeypots distributed across the Internet, with 
honeypots situated within the ICS network. 
Distributed honeypots are used to gather threat 
intelligence on botnets and scans in-the-wild 
such as patterns of targeted services and ports 
and source IPs where these scans originate. 
Together with blacklists, the data captured by 
these honeypots, are used to calibrate firewalls 
and IDS and ensure no device within the 
protected network has the same signatures as 
the attacked ones. The internal honeypots are 
divided between a compartmentalized honeypot 
network and the operational network. The 
honeypot network hosts several high-
interaction honeypots including ICS and 
standard IT infrastructures such as domain 
controllers, web and email servers and clients. 
These honeypots are designed to lure attackers 
to them instead of the operational network [7] 
and should be configured as if it was one. Data 
gathered from these honeypots provide data on 
current forms of malware and new exploitable 
vulnerabilities [8]. The honeypots within the 
operational network will be used to gather 
current threats mitigating within it and will 
allow administrators to gain valuable 
knowledge about the security of their network 
and systems. We suggest these honeypots to be 
low-interactive, to limit risks as high-
interaction honeypots can be taken over by 
malicious attackers [9]. The collected data will 
be automatically fed to a cloud-hosted server to 
store and analyse the captured traffic using 
state-of-the-art machine learning techniques 
[10]. Due to the nature of the process, the 
accuracy will improve over time. This analysed 
data can then be fed into an SDN based network 
controller which will automatically reconfigure 
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